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TLS/SSL and crypto library


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Rev. 日時 作者
12ad22d OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable 2019-12-20 22:10:12 Matt Caswell

Prepare for 1.0.2v-dev

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>

e818b74 OpenSSL_1_0_2u 2019-12-20 22:09:21 Matt Caswell

Prepare for 1.0.2u release

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>

7e0b689 2019-12-20 18:33:50 Matt Caswell

Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10664)

b10ccf7 2019-12-20 02:28:18 Matt Caswell

Updates NEWS for new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10663)

4975571 2019-12-05 09:26:16 Bernd Edlinger

Add a CHANGES entry for CVE-2019-1551

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10576)

ec8fcae 2019-12-05 06:57:18 Bernd Edlinger

Improve the overflow handling in rsaz_512_sqr

We have always a carry in %rcx or %rbx in range 0..2
from the previous stage, that is added to the result
of the 64-bit square, but the low nibble of any square
can only be 0, 1, 4, 9.

Therefore one "adcq $0, %rdx" can be removed.
Likewise in the ADX code we can remove one
"adcx %rbp, $out" since %rbp is always 0, and carry is
also zero, therefore that is a no-op.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10576)

f1c5eea 2019-12-05 06:57:16 Andy Polyakov

Fix an overflow bug in rsaz_512_sqr

There is an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure used in
exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis
suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024, 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a
result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed
likely. Attacks against DH512 are considered just feasible. However, for an
attack the target would have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not
recommended anyway. Also applications directly using the low level API
BN_mod_exp may be affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.

CVE-2019-1551

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10576)

b39c047 2019-10-28 22:20:02 Matt Caswell

Fix an s_server arbitrary file read issue on Windows

Running s_server in WWW mode on Windows can allow a client to read files
outside the s_server directory by including backslashes in the name, e.g.

GET /..\myfile.txt HTTP/1.0

There exists a check for this for Unix paths but it is not sufficient
for Windows.

Since s_server is a test tool no CVE is assigned.

Thanks to Jobert Abma for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10215)

(cherry picked from commit 0a4d6c67480a4d2fce514e08d3efe571f2ee99c9)

0159a1b 2019-10-16 22:01:58 Cesar Pereida Garcia

[crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c] Explicit test against NULL

As a fixup to https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9779 to better
conform to the project code style guidelines, this commit amends the
original changeset to explicitly test against NULL, i.e. writing

```
if (p != NULL)
```

rather than

```
if (!p)
```

(This is a backport of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9881)

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9882)

4e545c6 2019-10-15 21:28:36 Nicola Tuveri

[ec_asn1.c] Avoid injecting seed when built-in matches

An unintended consequence of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808
is that when an explicit parameters curve is matched against one of the
well-known builtin curves we automatically inherit also the associated
seed parameter, even if the input parameters excluded such parameter.

This later affects the serialization of such parsed keys, causing their
input DER encoding and output DER encoding to differ due to the
additional optional field.

This does not cause problems internally but could affect external
applications, as reported in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9811#issuecomment-536153288

This commit fixes the issue by conditionally clearing the seed field if
the original input parameters did not include it.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10141)

1c10029 2019-09-13 13:37:50 Bernd Edlinger

Fix no-asm build in windows

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9885)

fc437d8 2019-09-13 03:02:06 Bernd Edlinger

Remove known to fail versions from matrix

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9883)

a1ff24a 2019-09-10 22:37:06 Matt Caswell

Prepare for 1.0.2u-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

cd7c7fc OpenSSL_1_0_2t 2019-09-10 22:36:07 Matt Caswell

Prepare for 1.0.2t release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

c98ce13 2019-09-10 22:36:07 Matt Caswell

make update

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

b5decf6 2019-09-10 22:34:22 Matt Caswell

Fix the NEWS file

The NEWS file was missing an entry for 1.0.2s. This confuses the release
scripts - so add an empty entry.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9852)

32ef049 2019-09-10 22:01:06 Matt Caswell

Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9849)

2608005 2019-09-10 20:09:49 Matt Caswell

Remove duplicate CHANGES entry

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9846)

e21f8cf 2019-09-10 19:45:41 Bernd Edlinger

Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey

An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.

As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.

The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)

(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)

8bf7d77 2019-09-10 18:55:08 Matt Caswell

Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9843)

66fd724 2019-09-10 00:57:57 Nicola Tuveri

[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters

Description
-----------

Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.

This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)

A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.

Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.

Motivation
----------

This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface

Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.

It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.

Related commits
---------------

While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).

The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:

- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats

Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.

This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.

Responsible Disclosure
----------------------

This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.

The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>

(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9811)

21c856b 2019-09-09 16:34:44 Billy Brumley

[crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it

The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA
mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls
back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present.

This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all
curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more
SCA-robust code.

This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form,
where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent.

It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed
programatically with explicit parameters, then calling
EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero).

The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to
local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results
suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock
timing attacks.

CVE-2019-1547

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9799)

adaebd8 2019-09-09 16:16:47 Cesar Pereida Garcia

[crypto/rsa] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.

This commit addresses multiple side-channel vulnerabilities present during RSA key validation.
Private key parameters are re-computed using variable-time functions.

This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland.

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9785)

6a7bad0 2019-09-08 08:12:04 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre

Configure: clang: add -Wno-unknown-warning-option

Fixes travis build errors due to clang

error: unknown warning option '-Wno-extended-offsetof'

It seems like '-Wextended-offsetof' was removed from clang in version 6.0.0,
(see [1], [2]). While gcc ignores unknown options of the type '-Wno-xxx',
clang by default issues a warning [-Wunknown-warning-option] (see [3]), which
together with '-Werror' causes the build to fail.

This commit adds the '-Wno-unknown-warning-option' option to make clang
behave more relaxed like gcc.

[1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D40267
[2] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/52a3ca9e2909
[3] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/DiagnosticsReference.html#wunknown-warning-option

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9446)

920e37e 2019-09-06 22:55:42 Nicola Tuveri

[ec/ecp_nistp*.c] restyle: use {} around `else` too

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9793)

e3679b1 2019-09-06 22:51:58 Nicola Tuveri

[ec/ecp_nistp*.c] remove flip_endian()

Replace flip_endian() by using the little endian specific
bn_bn2lebinpad() and bn_lebin2bn().

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9793)

bde4a00 2019-09-06 22:37:57 Nicola Tuveri

Uniform bn_bn2binpad() and bn_bn2lebinpad() implementations

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9793)

853950f 2019-09-06 22:37:57 Nicola Tuveri

Make BN_num_bits() consttime upon BN_FLG_CONSTTIME

This issue was partially addressed by commit
972c87dfc7e765bd28a4964519c362f0d3a58ca4, which hardened its callee
BN_num_bits_word() to avoid leaking the most-significant word of its
argument via branching and memory access pattern.
The commit message also reported:
> There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where
> the bit length is also secret. This does *not* fully resolve those
> cases as we still only look at the top word.

BN_num_bits() is called directly or indirectly (e.g., through
BN_num_bytes() or BN_bn2binpad() ) in various parts of the `crypto/ec`
code, notably in all the currently supported implementations of scalar
multiplication (in the generic path through ec_scalar_mul_ladder() as
well as in dedicated methods like ecp_nistp{224,256,521}.c and
ecp_nistz256.c).

Under the right conditions, a motivated SCA attacker could retrieve the
secret bitlength of a secret nonce through this vulnerability,
potentially leading, ultimately, to recover a long-term secret key.

With this commit, exclusively for BIGNUMs that are flagged with
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME, instead of accessing only bn->top, all the limbs of
the BIGNUM are accessed up to bn->dmax and bitwise masking is used to
avoid branching.

Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily
allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with
the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an
out-of-bound read.
As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not
leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM
buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation
while manipulating it: this should be already done at the top level
alongside setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.

Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue
through responsible disclosure.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9793)

2e9d293 2019-09-06 21:56:45 Nicola Tuveri

Fix a SCA leak using BN_bn2bin()

BN_bn2bin() is not constant-time and leaks the number of bits in the
processed BIGNUM.

The specialized methods in ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c and
ecp_nistp521.c internally used BN_bn2bin() to convert scalars into the
internal fixed length representation.

This can leak during ECDSA/ECDH key generation or handling the nonce
while generating an ECDSA signature, when using these implementations.
The amount and risk of leaked information useful for a SCA attack
varies for each of the three curves, as it depends mainly on the
ratio between the bitlength of the curve subgroup order (governing the
size of the secret nonce/key) and the limb size for the internal BIGNUM
representation (which depends on the compilation target architecture).

To fix this, we replace BN_bn2bin() with bn_bn2binpad(), bounding the
output length to the width of the internal representation buffer: this
length is public.

Internally the final implementation of both bn_bn2binpad() and
BN_bn2bin() already has masking in place to avoid leaking bn->top
through memory access patterns.
Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily
allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with
the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an
out-of-bound read.
As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not
leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM
buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation
while manipulating it: this is already done at the top level alongside
setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.

Finally, the internal implementation of bn_bn2binpad() indirectly calls
BN_num_bits() via BN_num_bytes(): the current implementation of
BN_num_bits() can leak information to a SCA attacker, and is addressed
in the next commit.

Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue
through responsible disclosure.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9793)

55611d5 2019-08-27 17:25:51 Cesar Pereida Garcia

Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats

This commit addresses a side-channel vulnerability present when
PVK and MSBLOB key formats are loaded into OpenSSL.
The public key was not computed using a constant-time exponentiation
function.

This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland.

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9638)